Centering was formulated as a model of the relationship between attentional state, the form of referring expressions, and the coherence of an utterance within a discourse segment (Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein, 1986; Grosz, Joshi and Weinstein, 1995) . In this chapter, I argue that the restriction of centering to operating within a discourse segment should be abandoned in order to integrate centering with a model of global discourse structure. The within-segment restriction causes three problems. The first problem is that centers are often continued over discourse segment boundaries with pronominal referring expressions whose form is identical to those that occur within a discourse segment. The second problem is that recent work has shown that listeners perceive segment boundaries at various levels of granularity. If centering models a universal processing phenomenon, it is implausible that each listener is using a different centering algorithm.The third issue is that even for utterances within a discourse segment, there are strong contrasts between utterances whose adjacent utterance within a segment is hierarchically recent and those whose adjacent utterance within a segment is linearly recent. This chapter argues that these problems can be eliminated by replacing Grosz and Sidner's stack model of attentional state with an alternate model, the cache model. I show how the cache model is easily integrated with the centering algorithm, and provide several types of data from naturally occurring discourses that support the proposed integrated model. Future work should provide additional support for these claims with an examination of a larger corpus of naturally occurring discourses.
Introduction
Centering is formulated as a theory that relates focus of attention, choice of referring expression, and perceived coherence of utterances, within a discourse segment [Grosz et al., 1995] , p. 204. In this chapter, I argue that the restriction of centering to utterances within the same discourse segment poses three problems for the theory that can be eliminated by abandoning this restriction, and integrating centering with the cache model of attentional state proposed in [Walker, 1996] .
The first problem is that centers are often continued over discourse segment boundaries with pronominal referring expressions whose form is identical to those that occur within a discourse segment. For example, consider discourse A, a naturally occurring discourse excerpt from the Pear Stories [Chafe, 1980 , Passonneau, 1995 :
(A) (29) and he i 's going to take a pear or two, and then.. go on his way (30) um but the little boy i comes, (31) and uh he i doesn't want just a pear, (32) he i wants a whole basket. (33) So he i puts the bicycle down, (34) and he i ...
In an experiment where naive subjects coded discourses for segment structure [Passonneau, 1995] , a majority of subjects placed a discourse segment boundary between utterances (32) and (33). If utterance (32) and (33) were subjected to a centering analysis (cf. Walker, Joshi and Prince, this volume), (33) realizes a CONTINUE transition, indicating that utterance (33) is highly coherent in the context of utterance (32). It seems implausible that a different process than centering would be required to explain the relationship between utterances (32) and (33), simply because these utterances span a discourse segment boundary.
The second problem is that listeners perceive segment boundaries at various levels of granularity [Passonneau and Litman, 1993 , Hearst, 1994 , Flammia and Zue, 1995 , Hirschberg and Nakatani, 1996 , and some segment boundaries are 'fuzzy' [Passonneau and Litman, 1996] . For example in discourse A above, 5 out of 7 subjects placed a segment boundary between utterances 29 and 30, while 4 out of 7 subjects placed a segment boundary between utterances 32 and 33 [Passonneau, 1995] . If centering models a universal processing phenomenon, it is implausible that the subjects that place a segment boundary in these locations don't use centering to process the referring expressions in the discourse, while the subjects who didn't place a segment boundary do use centering for discourse processing.
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The third issue is that even for utterances within a discourse segment, there are strong contrasts between utterances whose adjacent utterance within a segment is hierarchically recent and those whose adjacent utterance within a segment is linearly recent. Briefly, an utterance U i is linearly recent for a subsequent utterance U i+j if U i occurred within the last few utterances. An utterance U i is hierarchically recent for a subsequent utterance U i+j if U i+j can become adjacent to U i as a result of Grosz and Sidner's stack mechanism Sidner, 1986, Walker, 1996] . For example consider the contrast between discourses B and C below, where C is a constructed variation of B [Pollack et al., 1982] :
This dialogue is from a corpus of naturally occurring financial advice dialogues that (8c) and they bring the child to us every day for babysitting.
The structure of Dialogue B is represented schematically in Figure 1 . In utterance 5 of dialogue B, the talk show host, H , interrupts the caller C to ask for his name. In utterance 8a, the caller C continues the problem statement that he began with utterance 4 as though utterance 4 had just been said, and so utterance 8a is part of the same discourse segment as utterance 4. The structure of Dialogue C is identical to that of B.
But if utterance 8a is in the same segment as utterance 4 in both dialogue B and C, there is an unexpected difference in the coherence of the utterance. The anaphoric referring expression, her husband is clearly more difficult to interpret in C. Thus hierarchical recency, as operationalized by the stack model, does not predict when previous centers are accessible.
I will argue that it is possible to integrate centering with a model of global discourse structure and simultaneously address these problems by replacing Grosz and Sidner's stack model of global focus with the cache model of attention state proposed in [Walker, 1996] . 2 In the resulting integrated model:
1. Centers are elements of the cache and the cache model mediates the accessibility of centers. 2. Centers are carried over segment boundaries by default. 3. Processing difficulties are predicted for the interpretation of centers whose co-specifiers are not linearly recent, as in the case of Dialogue C. 4. Granularity of discourse segmentation has no effect on the model. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed cache model, and section 3 defines a version of the centering algorithm [Brennan et al., 1987] that is integrated with the cache model. Then, three types of evidence are used to support the proposed integrated model.
were originally taped from a live radio broadcast and transcribed by Martha Pollack and Julia Hirschberg. I am grateful to Julia Hirschberg for providing me with audio tapes of these dialogues.
2 The cache model is an extension of the AWM model in [Walker, 1993a , Jordan and Walker, 1996 . First, section 4.1 presents evidence that the cache model can handle 'focus pops', a phenomenon that was believed to provide strong support for Grosz and Sidner's stack model. Then section 4.2 discuss quantitative evidence showing that centers are frequently carried over segment boundaries. Next, section 4.3 discuss a number of naturally occurring examples that illustrate that the form in which centers are realized across discourse segment boundaries is not determined by boundary type. Finally, section 5 summarizes the discussion and outlines future work.
The Cache Model of Attentional State
A cache is an easily accessible temporary location used for storing information that is currently being used by a computational procedure [Stone, 1987] . The fundamental idea of the cache model is that the functioning of the cache when processing discourse is analogous to that of a cache when executing a program on a computer. Just as discourses may be structured into goals and subgoals which contribute to achieving the purpose of the discourse, a computer program is hierarchically structured into routines and subroutines which contribute to completing the routine. Thus a cache can be used to model attentional state when intentions are hierarchically structured, just as a cache can be used for processing the references and operations of a hierarchically structured program.
In the cache model there are two types of memory: MAIN MEMORY represents long-term memory and the CACHE represents working memory [Baddeley, 1986] . Main memory is much larger than the cache, but is slower to access [Hintzman, 1988, Gillund and Schiffrin, 1984] . The cache is a limited capacity, almost instantaneously accessible, memory store. The size of the cache is a working assumption based on the findings of previous work [Kintsch, 1988 , Miller, 1956 , Alshawi, 1987 : CACHE SIZE ASSUMPTION: The cache is limited to 2 or 3 sentences, or approximately 7 propositions.
Given a particular cache size assumption, the definition of linear recency, discussed briefly above, can be made more precise, by setting the number of linearly adjacent utterances to be equal to the cache size parameter.
An utterance U i is linearly recent for utterance U j when it occurred within the past three linearly adjacent utterances.
There are three operations involving the cache and main memory. Items in the cache can be preferentially RETAINED and items in main memory can be RETRIEVED to the cache. Items in the cache can also be STORED to main memory. When new items are retrieved from main memory to the cache, or enter the cache directly due to events in the world, other items may be displaced to main memory, because the cache has limited capacity.
The determination of which items to displace is handled by a CACHE REPLACEMENT POLICY. In the cache model, the cache replacement policy is a working assumption, based on previous work on the effects of distance on anaphoric processing [Clark and Sengul, 1979 , Hobbs, 1976 , Hankamer and Sag, 1976 inter alia:
CACHE REPLACEMENT POLICY ASSUMPTION: The least recently accessed items in the cache are displaced to main memory, with the exception of those items preferentially retained.
The cache model includes specific assumptions about processing. Discourse processes execute on elements that are in the cache. All of the premises for an inference must be simultaneously in the cache for the inference to be made [McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992, Goldman, 1986] . If a discourse relation is to be inferred between two separate segments, a representation of both segments must be simultaneously in the cache [Fletcher et al., 1990 , Walker, 1993a . The cospecifier of an anaphor must be in the cache for automatic interpretation or be strategically retrieved to the cache in order to interpret the anaphor [Tyler and Marslen-Wilson, 1982, Greene et al., 1992] . Thus what is contained in the cache at any one time is a WORKING SET consisting of discourse entities such as entities, properties and relations that are currently being used for some process.
In the cache model, centers are a subset of entities in the cache, and the contents of the cache change incrementally as discourse is processed utterance by utterance, so by default centers are carried over from one segment to another The cache model is easily integrated with the centering rules and constraints by simply assuming that the Cf list for an utterance is a subset of the entities in the cache, and that the centering rules and constraints apply as usual, with the ordering of the Cf list providing an additional finer level of salience ordering for entities within the cache. .
The cache model maintains Grosz and Sidner's distinction between intentional structure and attentional state. This distinction is critical. However the cache model does not posit that attentional state is isomorphic to intentional structure. For example, when a new intention is recognized that is subordinate to the current intention, new entities may be created in the cache or be retrieved to the cache from main memory [Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988] , however old entities currently in the cache will remain until they are displaced. Thus centers from the previous intention are carried over by default until they are displaced. When a new intention that is subordinate to a prior intention is recognized, entities related to the prior intention must be retrieved to the cache, unless they were not displaced by the intervening discourse. In other words, the cache model casts attentional state in discourse processing as a gradient phenomenon, and predicts a looser coupling of intentional structure and attentional state. A change of intention affects what is in the cache, but the contents of the cache change incrementally, instead of changing instantaneously with one stack operation as they do with in stack model.
The cache model provides a natural explanation for the difference in the coherence between dialogue B and dialogue C. The CACHE SIZE ASSUMPTION in the cache model predicts that processing the longer interruption in C uses all of the cache capacity; thus returning to the prior discussion requires a retrieval from main memory. The success of this retrieval depends on two requirements: (1) the speaker must provide an adequate retrieval cue; and (2) the required information must have been stored in main memory. In the case of dialogue C, either requirement (1) or (2) may not be satisfied.
The differences between the two models are summarized below:
• New intention subordinate to current intention:
-Stack: Push new focus space -Cache: New entities retrieved to cache related to new intention, old entities remain until displaced • Completion of intention agreed by conversants explicitly or implicitly -Stack: Pop focus space for intention from stack, entities in focus space are no longer accessible -Cache: Don't retain entities for completed intention, but they remain accessible by virtue of being in the cache until they are displaced • New intentions subordinate to prior intention -Stack: Pop focus spaces for intervening segments, focus space for prior intention accessible after pop -Cache: Entities related to prior intention must be retrieved from main memory to cache, unless retained in the cache • Returning from interruption -Stack: Length and depth of interruption and the processing required is irrelevant -Cache: Length of interruption or the processing required predicts retrievals from main memory • Centering -Stack: No clear relationship between the focus stack mechanism and centering [Grosz and Sidner, 1985] ; (Grosz and Sidner, this volume) -Cache: Centers are a subset of the elements in the cache and centering provides a finer level of salience ordering for entities in the cache.
In the next section, I describe how the centering algorithm is integrated with the cache model.
Integrating the Centering Algorithm with the Cache Model
Brennan, Friedman and Pollard (1987) proposed a centering algorithm for the resolution of third person anaphors, based on the centering rules and constraints, whose top level structure is shown in Figure 2 . This section presents a version of that algorithm that is integrated with the cache model by assuming that the Cf list is a subset of entities available in the cache. The revised algorithm also incorporates observations from a corpus analysis of centering [Walker, 1989] , experimental processing results [Nicol and Swinney, 1989 , Greene et al., 1992 , Brennan, 1995 , Hudson-D'Zmura, 1988 , Gordon et al., 1993 , and proposals in Brennan etal. of simple ways to make the algorithm more efficient. This section extends and integrates work previously presented in [Brennan et al., 1987 , Walker, 1989 , Walker et al., 1994 , Walker, 1996 .
CENTERING ALGORITHM
1. CONSTRUCT THE PROPOSED ANCHORS for U n
INTERLEAVE CREATION AND FILTERING OF PROPOSED ANCHORS
3. UPDATE CONTEXT Figure 2 : Top Level Structure of the Centering Algorithm (Brennan, Friedman and Pollard, 1987) The centering algorithm starts with a set of reference markers for each utterance. Reference markers are generated for each referring expression in an utterance and are specified for agreement, grammatical function, and selectional restrictions; the values for these attributes arise from the verb's subcategorization frame [Pollard and Sag, 1988 , Reinhart, 1976 , Di Eugenio, 1990 , Walker et al., 1994 , Di Eugenio, 1997 , Passonneau, 1995 . 4 . Reference markers are also specified for contraindices, which are pointers to other reference markers that a marker cannot co-specify with [Reinhart, 1976, Pollard and Sag, 1988] ; 5 these are calculated during parsing. Each pronominal reference marker has a unique index from A 1 , . . . , A n which will be linked to the semantic representation of the cospecifier. For non-pronominal reference markers the surface string is used as the index. Indices for indefinites are generated from X 1 , . . . , X n .
CONSTRUCT THE PROPOSED ANCHORS for U n 1. Create set of referring expressions (REs). REs represent discourse entities in the representation of the discourse model. If there is a conjoined NP, make one RE whose extension is both entities. 3 2. Order REs by the Cf ranking for the language. Cf rankings are typically derived from a combination of syntactic, semantic and discourse features associated with entities evoked by the utterances in a discourse.
3. Create set of possible forward center (Cf) lists. Expand each element of (b) according to whether it is a pronoun, a description, or a proper name. These expansions are a way of encoding a disjunction of possibilities.
(a) Expand pronouns into set with entry for each RE in the Cf(U n−1 ) that is consistent with:
(1) its agreement features; (2) the selectional constraints projected by the verb; (3) 4. First, attempt to expand pronouns by unification with entities in the cache. If this returns null, reinstantiate the contents of the cache by using the pronominal features and the content of the utterance as retrieval cues for retrieving matching discourse entities from main memory. Then goto 5.
Create list of possible backward centers (Cbs)
. This is the REs from step 3 or 4 plus an additional entry of NIL to allow the possibility that the current utterance has no Cb. The first step of the centering algorithm is given in Figure 3 ; substep 4 of Figure 3 specifies how centering is integrated with the cache model. At the end of Step 1, the algorithm returns a set of potential Cbs and Cfs. The second step of the algorithm is given in Figure 4 . Figure 4 specifies how potential anchors (Cb-Cf combinations) are created, in the order of preference according to centering transitions. These anchors are then filtered further by Constraint 3 and Rule1 of the centering rules and constraints (Cf. Walker, Joshi and Prince, this volume). The first anchor to pass all the filters is used to update the context (Step 3 of the algorithm).
The difference between the algorithm above and that in [Brennan et al., 1987] is the point at which
INTERLEAVE CREATION AND FILTERING OF PROPOSED ANCHORS
1. Create the proposed anchors, the Cb-Cf combinations from the cross-product of the previous two steps, in order of preferred interpretations. Apply filters to each created anchor in order of preference.
( 2. For each anchor in the current list of anchors apply the following filters derived from the centering constraints and rules. The first anchor that passes each filter is used to update the context. If more than one anchor at the same ranking passes all the filters, then the algorithm predicts that the utterance is ambiguous. UPDATE CONTEXT If one of the anchors passes all the filters then choose that anchor for the current utterance. Set Cb(U n ) to the proposed Cb and Cf(U n ) to proposed Cf of this anchor. This will be the most highly ranked anchor. 6 In [Brennan et al., 1987] , all potential anchors were generated and then filtered.
Here fewer anchors are generated even in the worst case since some filters apply to potential Cf lists before the anchors are generated. In particular, filtering by contraindices is included earlier both for efficiency and because there is experimental evidence that this constraint is applied very early [Nicol and Swinney, 1989] . In addition, since the anchors are generated in preference order and then filtered, many fewer anchors are typically generated. For example in Dialogue D, a constructed monologue used by [Brennan et al., 1987] to illustrate the centering algorithm, only three anchors are generated where the original algorithm generated sixteen.
(D) a. Susan drives an Alfa Romeo. b. She drives too fast. c. Lyn races her on weekends. d. She often beats her.
Finally, the algorithm allows pronouns to be resolved to entities in the cache whenever pronouns cannot be unified with centers from the previous utterance.
Evidence for the proposed integrated model
Remember that centering was formulated as a process that operates on two utterance U n and U n+1 , within a discourse segment D, which attempts to explain the relationship between the form of referring expressions and underlying discourse processes, While Grosz and Sidner, (this volume) suggest that discourse segmentation affects the accessibility of centers, the hypothesis considered here is that the within-segment constraint should be abandoned. Furthermore, in the proposed integrated model, the cache contents, rather than discourse segment structure, determines the accessibility of centers.
To support the proposed integrated model, this section presents three types of evidence. Section 4.1 presents evidence that the cache model can handle 'focus pops', which were believed to provide strong support for Grosz and Sidner's stack model. Then section 4.2 discuss quantitative evidence showing that centers are frequently carried over segment boundaries. Finally section 4.3 discuss a number of naturally occurring examples that illustrate that the form in which centers are realized across discourse segment boundaries is not determined by boundary type.
Modeling Focus Pops with The Cache Model
Sometimes in a discourse, the conversants return to the discussion of a prior topic or continue an intention suspended in prior discourse. This kind of return has given rise to a phenomenon called RETURN POPS or FOCUS POPS, in reference to the stack mechanism which pops intervening focus spaces [Polanyi and Scha, 1984 , Reichman, 1985 , Grosz and Sidner, 1986 . The phenomenon that characterizes RETURN POPS is the occurrence of a pronoun in an utterance, where the antecedent for the pronoun is in the focus space representing the prior discourse, that is hierarchically recent. Thus it is commonly believed that this provides strong motivation for the role of hierarchical recency, and thus for Grosz and Sidner's stack model.
In the stack model, any of the focus spaces on the stack can be returned to, and the antecedent for a pronoun can be in any of these focus spaces. As a potential alternative to the stack model, the [Nakatani, 1993, Walker and Prince, In Press, Cahn, 1995] for a discussion of the difference between accented and unaccented NPs in this role.
cache model appears to be unable to handle return pops since a previous state of the cache can't be popped to. Since return pops are a primary motivation for the stack model, I re-examine all of the naturally-occurring return pops that I was able to find in the literature [Grosz, 1977 , Sidner, 1979 , Reichman, 1985 , Fox, 1987 , Passonneau and Litman, 1996 . 7 There are 21 of them. I argue that return pops are cued retrieval from main memory, that the cues reflect the context of the pop, that the cues are used to reinstantiate the relevant cache contents, and thus, that return pops are not problematic for the cache model.
As an example of a return pop, consider dialogue E [Passonneau and Litman, 1996] In dialogue E, the sequence from 21.5 to 23.1 is an embedded segment. According to the cache model, the cache is not automatically reset to contain the information from the interrupted segment after the final utterance of an embedded segment. Thus either that information must be retained because there is an expectation that it will be returned to, or at some point after utterance 23.1, perhaps as a result of processing 24.1, the hearer must retrieve the necessary information from main memory to the cache in order to reinstantiate it in the cache and interpret the pronoun in 24.1.
In the cache model, there are at least three possibilities for how the context is created so that pronouns in RETURN POPS can be interpreted: (1) The pronoun alone functions as a retrieval cue [Greene et al., 1992] ; or (2) The content of the first utterance in a return indicates what information to retrieve from mainmemory to the cache, which implies that the interpretation of the pronoun is delayed; (3) The shared knowledge of the conversants creates expectations that determines what is in the cache, e.g. shared knowledge of the task structure. I leave this last possibility aside for now.
Let us consider the first possibility. The view that pronouns must be able to function as retrieval cues is contrary to the classic view that pronouns indicate entities that are currently salient, i.e. in the hearer's consciousness [Chafe, 1976 , Gundel et al., 1993 , Prince, 1981 . However, there are certain cases where a pronoun alone is a good retrieval cue, such as when only one referent of a particular gender has been discussed in the conversation. With COMPETING ANTECEDENT defined as one that matches the gender and number of the pronoun [Fox, 1987] , Figure 6 shows the distribution of the 21 return pops found in the literature according to whether competing antecedents for the pronoun are elements of the discourse model. While it would be premature to draw final conclusions from such a small sample size, the numbers suggest that in about half the cases we could expect the pronoun to function as an adequate retrieval cue based on gender and number cues alone. [Sidner, 1979] , p. 88,89.
However, since representations (reference markers) for centers in the centering algorithm include selections restrictions from the verb's subcategorization frame, we might reasonably define COM-PETING ANTECEDENT to reflect the fact that the center's representation includes selectional restrictions [Di Eugenio, 1990 , Levin, 1993 ; Di Eugenio (this volume). 8 Furthermore, we expect that these selectional restrictions are used as retrieval cues.
Of the eleven tokens with competing referents in figure 6, five tokens have no competing referent if selectional restrictions are also applied. For example, in the dialogues about the construction of a pump from [Deutsch, 1974] , only some entities can be bolted, loosened, or made to work. Furthermore, if a selectional constraint can arise from the dialogue, then only 4 pronouns of the 21 return pops have competing referents. For example, the verb ride in dialogue E eliminates other antecedents because only one of the male discourse entities under discussion has, and has been riding, a bike [Passonneau and Litman, 1996] .
9 Thus in 17 cases, an adequate retrieval cue is constructed from processing the pronoun and the matrix verb [Di Eugenio, 1990] .
The second hypothesis is that the content of the return utterance indicates what information to retrieve from main memory to the cache. The occurrence of INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANT UT-TERANCES (IRUs) is one way of doing this [Walker, 1993a , Walker, 1996 . For example, in dialogue F [Passonneau and Litman, 1996] , utterances 4 to 8 constitute a separate segment, and utterance 9, which is the beginning of a return pop, is also an IRU, realizing the same propositional content as utterance 3.
(F)
(1) a-nd his bicycle hits a rock. 
and then these three other little kids about his same age come walking by.
IRUs at the locus of a return can: (1) reinstantiate required information in the cache so that no retrieval is necessary; (2) function as excellent retrieval cues for information from main memory. Figure 7 shows the distribution of IRUs in the 21 return pops found in the literature. The fact that IRUs occur in 6 cases shows that IRUs are often used to recreate the relevant context. IRUs in combination with selectional restrictions leave only 2 cases of pronouns in return pops with competing antecedents.
In the remaining 2 cases, the competing antecedent is not and was never prominent in the discourse, 8 In fact in languages with zero pronouns like Japanese, all the information is contained in the verb subcategorization frame [Iida, 1992 , Walker et al., 1994 . 9 Fox proposes that lexical repetition is used as a signal of where to pop to [Fox, 1987] , pps. 31,54.
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Figure 7: Number of Pops with Pronouns with and without IRUs i.e. it was never the discourse center [Iida, 1997] . This lack of prominence suggests that it may never compete with the other cospecifier.
Thus, while more evidence is needed, it is plausible that the cache model can handle this wellknown phenomenon, by positing that a return pop is a cued retrieval from main memory and that return pops never occur without an adequate retrieval cue for reinstantiating the required entities, properties and relations in the cache.
Distribution of Centering Transitions in Segment Initial Utterances
Continue One way to see whether discourse segment structures have a direct effect on centering data structures is by examining differences in the centering transitions across discourse segment boundaries, which indicates whether centers are carried over utterance pairs that span discourse segment boundaries. The cache model predicts that centers are carried over segment boundaries by default because they are elements of the cache, but that the recognition of a new intention may have an effect on centering because it may result in a retrieval of new information to the cache. It also predicts that the degree to which centers are carried over or retained depends directly on whether they continue to be used in the new segment (because the cache replacement policy is to replace the least recently accessed (used) discourse entities). This means that discourse segmentation should have a gradient effect on centering. Figure 8 shows centering transitions in 98 segment initial utterances [Walker, 1993b] , where discourse segment boundaries were identified by the use of the cue word now [Hirschberg and Litman, 1987] .
10
Now indicates a new segment that is a further development of a topic, and indicates a push in the stack model [Grosz and Sidner, 1986 , Reichman, 1985 , Hirschberg and Litman, 1993 . To my understanding this means that discourse segments that are initiated with utterances marked by the cue word now are either sister segments or subordinated segments.
The figure shows that centering transitions distribute differently for this type of segment initial utterance than they do for utterances in general. 11 A similar distributional difference in centering transitions is reported in [Passonneau, 1995] . The No Cb cases in Figure 8 indicate that there are some new segments where centers are not carried over, but note that even within a discourse segment, centers may not be carried over from one utterance to the next. In addition, in about two thirds of the segment initial utterances, centers are carried over discourse segment boundaries, so that there is a gradient effect of discourse segment boundaries on centering.
These distributional facts demonstrate the need for a model of global focus that is integrated with centering, and provides support for the proposed cache model since centers are clearly carried over segment boundaries, and since there is a gradient effect of segmentation on centering transitions.
Discourse Configurations and Centering Data Structures
This section presents data showing that discourse segment structure does not determine the accessibility of centers. It is well known that accessibility of discourse entities is reflected by linguistic form [Gundel et al., 1993 , Prince, 1981 , Prince, 1992 , Brennan, 1995 . Furthermore, psychological studies of centering have shown that a processing penalty is associated with realizing the Cb by a full noun phrase (Hudson, this volume), [Gordon et al., 1993] . Thus below the realization of the Cb (linguistic form) is used as an indicator of whether discourse segmentation has a direct effect on accessibility. In order to show that discourse segment structure doesn't determine accessibility, we must examine the linguistic form of centers across all potential discourse segment structure configurations. This means we must define all potential discourse structure configurations. Figure 9 illustrates different discourse structures in Grosz and Sidner's theory and shows how segments consist of groupings of utterances which can be embedded within one another. These discourse structure configurations vary in terms of whether two utterances can be considered to be linearly recent or hierarchically recent.
In Figure 9 , utterance A1 is both linearly and hierarchically recent for A2. Since the utterances before and after segment B are both part of segment A, utterance A2 is hierarchically recent when A3 is interpreted, although it is not linearly recent. Utterance B3 is linearly recent when A3 is interpreted, but not hierarchically recent. Similarly B3 is not hierarchically recent for A4. In the second discourse, C1 is hierarchically recent for both D1 and E1, but only linearly recent for D1. Utterance D3 is linearly recent for E1, but not hierarchically recent.
Linear recency approximates what is in the cache because if something has been recently discussed, it was recently in the cache, and thus is is more likely to still be in the cache than other items. Linear recency ignores the effects of preferentially retaining items in the cache, and retrieving items from main memory to the cache. Given these terms, Figure 10 enumerates all the relevant discourse structure configurations. The columns of Figure 10 are the types of discourse segment boundaries that two utterances U n−1 and U n can span in terms of intentional structure and linear and hierarchical recency. The rows enumerate differences in linguistic form that are known to indicate center accessibility, i.e. whether the Cb(U n−1 ) is realized in U n as a pronoun or as a Full NP. The combination of these two dimensions defines eight discourse situations.
Types 1 and 2 are utterance pairs that are linearly recent but not hierarchically recent because a related sister segment, e.g. segment D, has already been popped off the stack. Types 3 and 4 are utterance pairs that are both linearly and hierarchically recent. Types 5 and 6 are utterance pairs where U n−1 is hierarchically recent but not linearly recent. Types 7 and 8 are utterance pairs where U n−1 is linearly recent but not hierarchically recent, because an unrelated interrupting segment has been popped off the stack.
To test the hypothesis that segment structure does not determine accessibility, we must examine naturally occurring text or dialogue excerpts that exemplify each configuration. See Appendix A for a specification of criteria used to identify relevant examples. The remaining sections each discuss two of the discourse types from Figure 10 using excerpts from the Harry Gross corpus [Pollack et al., 1982 , Walker, 1993a , the SwitchBoard Corpus from the LDC, Phil Cohen's corpus of telephone-based dialogues between an expert and an apprentice who must put together a plastic water pump [Cohen, 1984] , and excerpts from the Pear Stories Corpus from [Passonneau and Litman, 1993, Passonneau and . Centers are indicated by italics and discourse segment structures are marked by horizontal lines in the transcripts of the discourse. 
Type 1 and 2: Sister intention
A sister intention discourse configuration is shown in Figure 9 for segments D and E; E is a sister to D. The Pear Stories narrative in Figure 11 from [Passonneau and Litman, 1996] illustrates two sister intention discourse segments, 13 with the segment boundaries marked between utterances 29 and 30 and between utterances 32 and 33.
14 12 There may be additional segment structure beyond what is indicated. 13 Based on assumption 4 (Appendix A), segment 7 is a sister of segment 6 and segment 8 is a sister of segment 7.
14 These boundaries are those marked by a significant number of naive subjects in Passonneau and Litman's experiments. Consider the segment boundary spanned by utterance 29b and utterance 30. In segment 7, utterance 30, the full noun phrase the little boy realizes the Cb of utterance 30 [Passonneau, 1995] . The discourse entity for the little boy is also the Cb of utterance 29b and the Cp of utterance 30, so the centering transition is a CONTINUE. Thus, this is an example of Type 2 in Figure 10 : the Cb(U n−1 ) is realized as a full NP across a segment boundary for two sister segments. Now, consider the relation between utterance 32 and utterance 33 spanning the second segment boundary. Utterance 33 is also segment initial, and the discourse entity for the little boy is the Cb, but in this case this entity is cospecified by the referring expression he. Here, as in utterance 30, the discourse entity for the little boy is the Cb of the previous utterance, utterance 32, and the Cp of the current utterance, utterance 33, defining a CONTINUE transition. Thus, this is an example of Type 1 in Figure 10 : the Cb of 32 is realized as a pronoun across a segment boundary.
Clearly, both Type 1 and Type 2 can occur and the Cb of an utterance can be continued by means of a pronoun in the initial utterance of a sister segment. Because a pronoun can be used in this configuration, there is little motivation for introducing an additional mechanism besides centering to explain the accessibility of the center over sister segment boundaries. The use of the pronoun here can be explained quite naturally by assuming that centering operates over sister segment utterances, represented abstractly in Figure 9 by D3 and E1.
Type 3 and 4: New subordinated intention
A new subordinated intention defines a new discourse segment embedded within the immediately preceding segment, as segment D is embedded within segment C in Figure 9 . Figure 12 consists of an excerpt from the financial advice dialogue corpus [Pollack et al., 1982] , showing one segment boundary. This segment boundary is based on the assumption that a clarifying question initiates a new discourse segment [Litman, 1985] . Utterance 33 is a segment initial utterance that refers to the Cb of utterance 32 with the referring expression it. 15 Since this is the only center on the Cf, it is also the Cb, resulting in a CONTINUE centering transition. Thus, Figure 6 is The discourse segmentation is based on assumptions about the structure of clarifications [Litman, 1985] .
utterance 33 shows that a Cb can be continued with a pronoun across a segment boundary where the second segment is embedded within the first.
Expert: Now take the blue cap with the two prongs sticking out 2 Expert: and fit the little piece of pink plastic on it. Ok? 3 Apprentice: Ok.
N+1 4
Expert: Insert the rubber ring into that blue cap. (RETAIN) Figure 13 : Excerpt from Pump Dialogue Corpus (Cohen, 1984) illustrating Type 4. The discourse segmentation is based on the task structure (Grosz, 1977; Sibun,1991) . Figure 13 is an excerpt from Cohen's corpus of task-related dialogues about the construction of a toy water pump [Cohen, 1984] , with one segment boundary indicated. Here, the segment boundary is based on the assumption that a new subtask initiates a subordinated segment [Grosz, 1977] . 16 This is an example of Type 4 because the Cb of utterance 3 is cospecified by a deictic NP, that blue cap, in utterance 4. In this case, the previous Cb is not predicted to be the Cb of the following utterance since the centering transition is a RETAIN, and this may be one factor involved in the choice of a deictic NP for the referring expression.
Clearly both Type 3 and Type 4 can occur, These types realize utterance pairs that are both linearly and hierarchically recent, and show that the Cb of the initial utterance of a subordinated segment can be expressed with either a full NP or a pronoun. Thus, it is plausible that centering operates over segment boundaries for subordinated segments, represented abstractly by the relation between C1 and D1 in Figure 9. In section 4.1 we discussed focus pops, and argued that focus pops could be modeled with the cache model. Here we are interested in determining whether the relevant structures for centering are determined by hierarchical recency or by linear recency of adjacent utterances. Thus, when a focus pop occurs there are two logical choices for selecting U n−1 for the purposes of centering, one choice defined by linear recency and the other defined by hierarchical recency. Types 5 and 6 select U n−1 by hierarchical recency. In Figure 9 , the relevant examples of hierarchically recent utterances defined by focus pops let A2 be U n−1 for A3 and let C1 be U n−1 for E1. Figure 14 is from the Pear Stories corpus, with discourse segment boundaries marked by human judges [Passonneau and Litman, 1996] . This is a naturally occurring exemplar of the first discourse in Figure 9 ; segment 15 is an interruption and segment 16 is a continuation of segment 14. This analysis is also supported by: (1) the obvious change in content and lexical selection [Morris and Hirst, 1991, Hearst, 1994] ; and (2) the fact that utterance 9 is an INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANT UTTERANCE, IRU, which re-realizes the content of utterance 3, and reintroduces its content in the current context [Walker, 1993a , Walker, 1996 . Thus, using hierarchical recency to determine U n−1 for the purposes of centering, U n is utterance 9 at the beginning of segment 16 and U n−1 is utterance 3 at the end of segment 14. Then, Figure 14 is an example of Type 5 because a pronoun is used in utterance 9 to realize the Cb of utterance 3, despite the intervening segment 15. Figure 15 is an excerpt from the Switchboard corpus in which the topic of the discussion was Family Life. The discourse segment boundaries shown here were identified on the basis of the claim that the cue word anyway marks a focus stack pop to an earlier segment [Polanyi and Scha, 1984 , Grosz and Sidner, 1986 , Reichman, 1985 . Utterance 5 in segment 3 starts with the cue word anyway and returns to the discussion of which sports the speaker's oldest son likes, after a brief digression about the speaker's little girl. Figure 15 is an example of Type 6 because this focus pop realizes the Cb of utterance 3 with a full NP, my oldest son. Note that no other male entity has been introduced into the conversation, so on the basis of informational adequacy alone, the pronoun he would have sufficed [Passonneau, 1996] .
Type 5 and 6: Focus Pop with Hierarchical Recency
Types 5 and 6 are utterance pairs where U n−1 is hierarchically recent, but not linearly recent. The existence of Types 5 and 6 shows that the Cb of an utterance in a prior discourse segment (A2 be referred to by either a pronoun or a full NP in the initial utterance of a return (A3). Since both Type 5 and Type 6 can occur, it would seem that popping alone does not make strong predictions about the realization of the Cb.
Type 7 and 8: Focus Pop with Linear Recency
In section 4.3.3, we examined focus pops where U n−1 for the purposes of centering was defined by hierarchical recency. In Types 7 and 8, utterance U n−1 for the purpose of centering is defined by linear recency, where U n−1 belongs to a segment that is popped off the stack before, or at the time that, U n is processed. The linearly recent utterance is analagous to letting B3 be U n−1 for A3 in Figure 9 .
The segment structures for both Figures 16 and 17 , illustrating Types 7 and 8, are defined on the basis that the cue word anyway marks a pop to a previous discourse segment, as posited by [Reichman, 1985, Grosz and Sidner, 1986] . Thus in Figure 16 , utterance 33b begins a new segment and in Figure 17 , utterance 7 begins a new segment. However, in order to examine the effect of hierarchical recency, the beginning of the intervening segment that is to be popped must be identified. In Figure 16 , utterance 27a in segment 2 is assumed to be hierarchically recent for utterance 33b in segment 4 based on the IRU when X came into power in utterance 33b [Walker, 1993a] . In Figure 17 , the tense change from past to past imperfect between utterances 3a and 3b is used to identify a discourse segment boundary [Webber, 1988b] , so that segment 3 is hierarchically adjacent to segment 1. Figure 16 shows a conversation from the SwitchBoard corpus in which two subjects are discussing the topic Latin America, as seen in A's conversational opener in utterance 1. The segment boundary of interest is that between utterance 33a and 33b. Segment 3, from utterances 27c to 33a, is about trying to remember the name of the leader of the Contras, and establishes centers for both the Contra leader and for the discourse entity representing his name. Establishing his name is a minimal part of the story that speaker A is trying to tell. Segment 4 continues the Cb of the Contra leader, and continues the story begun in utterance 27a, as shown by the paraphrase of When the contras came into power with (the Contra leader). Clearly segment 4 continues the intention initiated in utterance 27b. Thus the focus space stack for segment 3 should be popped from the stack by the use of the cue word anyway. However, the use of the pronoun he to refer to the Contra leader in 33b would not be supported by the focus space for segment 2 that would be on the top of the stack after the pop, since segment 3 actually established this discourse entity as a center. Figure 17 is also an excerpt from the Switchboard corpus. In this case, the topic of the discussion was home decorating. In utterance 7, speaker A marks a focus pop with the cue word anyway. But what intention is segment 3 related to? I identified utterance 3a as the last utterance of the hierarchically adjacent segment because the past imperfect tense is used in utterance 3b when the simple past was used for utterance 3a [Webber, 1988a] . In addition, it is plausible that on semantic grounds segment 2 provides background for segment 3 [Hobbs, 1985] , and thus that the intention of segment 2 must be realized before that of segment 3. 17 Then, this is an example of Type 8 because the phrase that color in utterance 7 refers to the Cb of utterance 5 from segment 2, when the focus space for segment 2 should be popped off the stack.
Types 7 and 8 are utterance pairs where U n−1 is linearly recent but not hierarchically recent, because the interrupting segment has been popped off the stack. The existence of Types 7 and 8 illustrate that the Cb of an utterance in a 'popped' segment (B3) can be referred to by either a pronoun or a full NP in the initial utterance of a new 'pushed' segment (A3 occur, there seems to be no basis for assuming that the centering data structures are directly affected by popping to a prior focus space on the stack. The occurrence of Type 7 is strong support for the cache model since there is clearly a change of intention between utterances 33a and 33b, but centers as part of attentional state are carried over and realized with pronominal forms that clearly indicate their accessibility.
Discussion
Centering is formulated as a theory that relates focus of attention, choice of referring expression, and perceived coherence of utterances, within a discourse segment [Grosz et al., 1995] , p. 204. In this chapter I argue that the within-segment restriction of centering must be abandoned in order to integrate centering with a model of global discourse structure. I have discussed several problems that this restriction causes. The first problem is that centers are often continued over discourse segment boundaries with pronominal referring expressions whose form is identical to those that occur within a discourse segment. The second problem is that recent work has shown that listeners perceive segment boundaries at various levels of granularity and that segment boundaries are often fuzzy. If centering models a universal processing phenomenon, it seems implausible that each listener's centering algorithm differs according to whether they perceived a segment boundary or not, especially as there is evidence that centering is a fairly automatic process (Hudson-D'Zmura and Tanenhaus, this volume). The third issue is that even for utterances within a discourse segment, there are strong contrasts between utterances that are adjacent within a segment because they are hierarchically recent and utterances that are adjacent within a segment and also linearly recent.
This chapter argues that an integrated model of centering and global focus can be defined that eliminates these problems by replacing Grosz and Sidner's stack model of attentional state, with an alternate model, the cache model [Walker, 1996 , Walker, 1993a . In the cache model, centering applies to discourse entities in the cache, and the contents of the cache can be affected by the recognition of intention. However centers are carried over segment boundaries by default, and are only displaced from the cache when they are not being accessed. When a digression requires the use of all the cache, a return requires a retrieval from main memory to reinstantiate relevant discourse entities in the cache. Since this retrieval has some processing costs, the cache model predicts a role for linear recency which is not predicted by the stack model. The proposed model integrates centering with discourse structure defined by relations between speaker intentions.
To provide support for the proposed integrated model, I first show, in Section 3, how the centering algorithm is easily integrated with the cache model. Then, in sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, I provide three types of data that support the integrated model. First, I show that 'focus pops' can be handled by the cache model by positing that they correspond to cued retrieval from main memory. I show how features of the utterance in which the focus pop occurs provide information that functions as an adequate retrieval cue from main memory.
Second, I examine the distribution of centering transitions in 98 segment initial utterances. I show that that centering transitions distribute differently in segment initial utterances, and in particular that CONTINUE transitions are less frequent. However it is clear that centers are carried over segment boundaries, as the cache model would predict.
Third, section 4.3 examines every type of discourse structure configuration in order to explore the relationship between centering and hierarchical intentional structure. The data suggests that intentional structure does not define a rule that directly predicts whether a discourse entity will be realized as a full NP or as a pronoun across a segment boundary. Figure 16 shows that even segments that have been popped from the stack can provide a center across a discourse segment boundary.
These findings provide support for the proposed cache model. Since centers are in the cache, they are carried over segment boundaries by default. In contrast, in the stack model, the focus space where the center was established has been popped off the stack. The cache model predicts a statistical correlation between intentional structure and changes in intentional state, which would arise because a change of intention can trigger a retrieval of information to the cache, as in the case of 'focus pops'. But in order for hearers to retrieve the correct information to the cache, either automatically or strategically, the utterance must provide an adequate retrieval cue [Ratcliff and McKoon, 1988, McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992] .
The cache model is also consistent with results of other work, and with psychological models of human working memory [Baddeley, 1986] . For example Davis and Hirschberg proposed that rules for synthesizing directions in text-to-speech must treat popped entities as accessible and de-accent them [Davis and Hirschberg, 1988] . Huang proposed that rules for the form of referring expressions in argumentative texts must treat the conclusions of popped sisters as salient [Huang, 1994] . Walker argued that the cache model explains the occurrence of INFORMATIONALLY REDUNDANT UTTER-ANCES, IRUs, such as utterance 9 in Figure 14 , as a way of providing an adequate retrieval cue for reinstantiating relevant information in the cache [Walker, 1996] .
However a number of open issues remain. First, while previous work has shown that a processing penalty is associated with the use of a full NP to continue the current Cb [Hudson-D'Zmura, 1988 , Gordon et al., 1993 ; (Hudson-D'Zmura and Tanenhaus, this volume), a full NP is used to continue the Cb in the examples of Types 2 and 6 ( Figures 5 and 9 ). 18 Why does this occur?
One possibility is that the use of the Full NP is one of a number of potentially redundant cues that the speaker has available for signalling intentional structure, so that the choice of a Full NP or a pronoun is not determined by the current attentional state [Fox, 1987 , Yeh, 1995 , Passonneau, 1996 .
A second possibility is the Full NP is used to signal the rhetorical relation of contrast [Fox, 1987 , Mann and Thompson, 1987 , Hobbs, 1985 . This would explain the use of a Full NP for both Type 2 ( Figure 5 ) and Type 6 (Figure 9 ), and unify these two cases with observations by [Fox, 1987] and by Di Eugenio (this volume). In Figure 5 , a contrastive relation between utterances 29 and 30 is indicated by but. These segments contrast with one another by presenting alternate possible worlds of what might have happened with what did happen. In Figure 9 , the NP my oldest son is an example of Left-Dislocation [Prince, 1985] , i.e the discourse entity realized as my oldest son is realized in an initial phrase, and then again by the pronoun he in subject position. One function of Left-Dislocation is to mark an entity as already evoked in the discourse or in a salient set relation to something evoked, and contrast is inferred from the marking of a salient set relation [Prince, 1986] . Note that if contrast is determining the use of the full NP, we expect overspecified NPs to occur just as frequently within discourse segments as in segment initial utterances.
Finally, future work should investigate what constitutes an adequate retrieval cue for focus pops and how a speaker's choices about the forms of referring expressions interacts with other retrieval cues, such as propositional information. In order to do this, it would be useful to have a large corpus of data tagged for intentional structure.
A larger tagged corpus would also allow us to go beyond the study here, which simply showed that intentional structures do not appear to define a rule that determines the accessibility of centers. More data on the frequency with which various forms of referring expressions are chosen in different situations would be useful. [Walker and Whittaker, 1990] showed that in mixed-initiative dialogues, pronominal forms were more likely to cross discourse segment boundaries when one speaker interrupted the other than when transitions between segments were negotiated between the conversants. [Passonneau, 1995] discusses the frequency with which Full NPs are used to realize entities currently salient in the discourse. In [Walker, 1993b] , the frequency of various forms of referring expressions was calculated for the segment boundaries discussed in section 4.2. (Brennan, this volume) , shows that speakers are about twice as likely to use a full NP rather than a pronoun if an utterance intervenes between the pronoun and its antecedent in the discourse, and that pronouns and full NPs are equally likely in the same situation when there is no intervening utterance. More data of this type would be useful in defining algorithms for the generation of referring expressions, and for determining additional factors involved in the referring expression choice.
In conclusion, this chapter presents a model that integrates centering with hierarchical discourse structures defined by speaker intention. The important features of the proposed integrated model are that it: (1) explains the differences in felicity between Dialogues B and C; (2) predicts that centers are carried over discourse segment boundaries by default; (3) predicts a gradient effect of discourse segment structure on centering as we see in Figure 8 ; (4) predicts that granularity of intention-based segmentation has no effect on centering; (5) predicts an increase in processing load for pronouns in focus pops; and (6) is consistent with psychological models of human sentence and discourse processing.
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